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REAL PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND
TENANT, MORTGAGES, AND LIENS
by
John 0. Cunningham*
and James L Harlan**
I. LANDLORD AND TENANT
OURTS decided nearly thirty cases affecting Texas law in the land-
lord-tenant area, and significant legislative developments took place
during the survey period. None of the reported landlord-tenant
cases reached the Texas Supreme Court in 1985, although the court did hold
a property owner liable for failing to lock vacant apartments securely to pre-
vent their use for crimes.'
A. Interpretation and Construction of Leases
Attorneys drafting or negotiating lease provisions should be aware of sev-
eral decisions in this area. In Estes v. Wilson 2 a commercial tenant sued his
landlord for specific performance of an option to purchase after the landlord
began taking steps to evict the tenant. Under the lease agreement, the land-
lord granted the option, and the tenant agreed to pay all taxes and to con-
tinue the current insurance until he exercised the purchase option. The trial
court found a forfeiture of the tenant's interest by his failure to pay taxes or
maintain insurance as required by the lease. 3 The tenant argued on appeal
that the tax and insurance requirements were covenants instead of condi-
tions. The tenant urged that the proper remedy for the breach of a covenant
was a suit in damages rather than forfeiture. 4 The appellate court ruled that
* B.A., Wabash College; J.D., Boston College. Attorney at Law, The Southland Corpo-
ration, Dallas, Texas (Author-Landlord and Tenant).
** B.A., M.A., Chapman College; J.D., Drake University. Attorney at Law, Hytken,
Harlan & Nye, Dallas, Texas (Author-Mortgages and Liens).
1. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985). Two
Justices of the Supreme Court of Texas joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice McGee. 690
S.W.2d at 555.
2. 682 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
3. Id. at 713. The trial court also found that the tenant forfeited his interest by sublet-
ting without the landlord's permission. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
4. Another case reported during the survey period provides support for this argument.
In Buffalo Pipeline Co. v. Bell, 694 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ rerd
n.r.e.), the court construed an option to extend a lease as an automatic renewal that the lessee
failed to terminate. Id. at 597. The court acknowledged the lessee's breach of a covenant to
pay rent during the original term, but stated that the lessor's remedy was damages. Id. at 598.
If the proper treatment of a lease clause appears doubtful, the court should construe the clause
as a covenant and not as a condition because the law opposes forfeitures. Id. The court also
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the insurance clause created a condition precedent to the exercise of the op-
tion rather than a covenant because damages could not adequately remedy a
breach of this requirement. 5 The meaningfulness or availability of a remedy
in damages may determine whether a court will treat a clause as a covenant
or condition.
A different appellate court reached a conflicting result in Buffalo Pipeline
Co. v. Bell.6 The tenant, after failing to pay rent to the correct party, sought
to exercise an option to renew. The lease contract did not specify that failure
to pay rent caused a forfeiture of the lessee's interest. The appellate court
noted the common law rule that the lease contract must specifically provide
for forfeiture in the event of non-payment; otherwise, the landlord may sue
only for damages. 7 The court emphasized that the law does not favor for-
feitures and favors covenants over conditions in doubtful cases.8 Presuma-
bly, since the renewal option was part of the lease, the rule that courts will
construe a lease against the lessor applied to the option.
In Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co.9 the Fifth Circuit applied a
number of principles of lease interpretation. A lessor sued a former tenant
for breach of contract, alleging that the tenant had failed to clear the amount
of acreage that the lease required. The tenant had agreed to clear and keep
clear at least 7,000 acres during the ten year term of the lease. The lease
further required that the tenant clear at least 700 acres each year and not less
than 4,000 acres on or before the end of the third year. The district court
held the lessor's claim barred by the statute of limitations1 ° because, under
the court's interpretation, the lease ostensibly required the clearing of 7,000
acres more than five years before the lessor had filed suit,II and the lessor's
failure to discover the breach caused the limitation period to run. Writing
for the appellate court, Judge Higginbotham reversed, reasoning that the
contract could not possibly mean what it appeared to say. 12 If the tenant
cleared 4,000 acres during the first three years and then cleared 700 acres in
each of the seven remaining years, the tenant would have cleared 8,900
acres, more acres than the entire leasehold comprised.' 3 The court con-
cluded that it had to harmonize the three requirements: 700 acres per year;
4,000 acres by the end of the third year; and 7,000 acres during the ten year
stated that, generally, courts should construe a lease most strongly against the lessor. Id. See
infra text accompanying note 8. Thus, an optionee might be well advised to incorporate his
option into a lease agreement if possible.
5. 682 S.W.2d at 716.
6. 694 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
7. Id. at 598.
8. Id. The Estes court did not emphasize this rule.
9. 747 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 983. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958) has been repealed,
effective September 1, 1985, and replaced by TEX. CIv. PRACT. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004
(Vernon Pam. 1986). Both provide a four year limitation period on certain contract actions.
11. The district court added 700 acres per year to the 4,000 acre minimum for the first
three years and concluded that the lease required clearing of the entire 7,000 acres by the end
of the eighth year of the ten year lease. 747 F.2d at 983.
12. Id. at 984.
13. 4,000 acres by the end of the third year plus (seven times 700) 4,900 acres equals 8,900
acres.
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lease term. 14 The court apparently decided that the 700 acre requirement
was only an average annual requirement below which the tenant could not
fall at any point in the lease.15 The court therefore held that the tenant did
not have to reach the 7,000 acre total until the end of the ten year term and
that the statute of limitations had not run before the lessor filed his claim. 16
The Chapman court could have decided that the lease requirement to
clear 700 acres each year meant just what it said if the court had recognized
that the lease called for the tenant to clear and keep cleared 7,000 acres.
This would have created only a duty to keep clear in the last two years of the
lease. The court relied on the following well-established principles of lease
law: (a) the intentions of the parties control interpretation;1 7 (b) the court
must glean the parties' intentions from the complete document by harmoniz-
ing and effectuating all terms of the agreement so that each one has signifi-
cance; 18 and (c) the court must reconcile ambiguous provisions if possible,1 9
unless they prove unavoidably repugnant. 20 The court also reasoned that
because the tenant failed to raise or prove the affirmative defense of limita-
tions in the trial court, nothing in the record indicated that the parties in-
tended that the lessee complete the clearing before the lease expired. 21 Thus,
failure to prove intent in the trial court may permit an appellate court to
make its own construction of a lease for the parties.
In Aldridge v. Young 22 a lessor, presumably to raise rents, sought declara-
tory judgment that certain leases were invalid and unenforceable. The ten-
ants occupied the property under a lease addendum that granted them the
right to extend the lease for an additional fifteen years. The lease addendum
failed to specify the amount of rent for the additional term. The lessor there-
fore claimed that the contract failed for indefiniteness or uncertainty. The
court stated that a general covenant to renew that does not specify renewal
terms implies a renewal on the existing terms.23 On this basis, the court held
that the renewal implied the same rent as provided in the original lease and
enforced the lease addendum. 24 The court distinguished other cases invali-
dating leases uncertain as to price by reasoning that none of the other cases
involved renewals or options silent as to rent, but rather involved renewals
or options with ambiguous or contradictory terms that could not be
reformed. 25
14. 747 F.2d at 983.
15. Under the court's interpretation, at the end of each year the lease required that the
tenant have a total cleared acreage of 700 times the number of years elapsed. Id. at 984.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 983.
18. Id. (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
19. 747 F.2d at 983 (citing Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex.
1983)).
20. 747 F.2d at 983 (citing Western Oil Fields, Inc. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 421 F.2d
387, 389 (5th Cir. 1970)).
21. 747 F.2d at 984-85.
22. 689 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).





Wadler v. American Motors Sales Corp. 26 again required the Fifth Circuit
to harmonize the provisions of a lease. Judge Williams wrote a well-rea-
soned opinion for a court that had examined much evidence in reaching an
interpretation based on the parties' actions. A lessor sued former lessees for
breach of covenants to repair, alleging that the tenants owed damages for
failure to make repairs to the heating, ventilation and air conditioning sys-
tems. One lease covenant required the lessees to keep the premises in good
order and condition by making all necessary repairs, structural and non-
structural, at their own expense; another required only that the lessees re-
turn the property at the end of the lease term in the same condition as when
the lease began except for reasonable use and ordinary wear. As in Chap-
man, the court stated that it must give effect to the intentions of the parties
by harmonizing all provisions of the contract. 27 After noting that the lease
involved the entirety of a new building, did not provide for escalating rents,
required only lump sum payments, and permitted the lessor to inspect the
property during the term and charge necessary repairs to the tenants, the
court inferred that the tenants undertook to act as reasonable owners would
for the term of the lease. 28 The court held that the lease obligated the lessees
to repair or replace any part of the building not in good order and condition
even if reasonable use and wear brought about the deterioration. 29 The
court further held that the lessees need not repair deterioration due to rea-
sonable use and wear if the property remained in good order and condi-
tion.30 The opinion openly acknowledged that it might be contrary to Texas
cases 31 disfavoring broad interpretations of repair covenants. 32
Two other interpretation and constitution cases deserve mention. In
Brooks v. Blue Ridge Insurance Co. 33 the court construed the word "tenant"
for purposes of insurance coverage when the policy did not define the term.
The court defined a tenant as one "authorized by a lease to occupy a dwell-
ing to the exclusion of others .. . . 34 A right of entry and permissive right
to occupy a place but not exclude others would be inadequate. 35 In Mayfield
v. Benavides36 the appellate court simply applied the principles that the in-
tentions of the parties as expressed in the lease govern and that the court
26. 764 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 414.
28. Id. at 415.
29. Id. at 416.
30. Id.
31. See Orgain v. Butler, 478 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ)(covenant to return premises in good condition did not make lessee an insurer); B&B Vending
Co. v. Carpenter, 472 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ) (courts do not
favor making a lessee an insurer by means of covenants to repair premises and return them in
good condition).
32. 764 F.2d at 416.
33. 677 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
34. Id. at 652 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.001(6) (Vernon 1984) and citing
Mallam v. Trans-Texas Airways, 227 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, no
writ)).
35. 677 S.W.2d at 652.
36. 693 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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must harmonize all provisions to reach a reasonable construction.37 The
parties' gas lease provided a renewal right for up to 640 acres so long as
there was a producing well. The court applied the stated principles to decide
that the tenant could renew only the acreage around the producing well and
that the tenant could not pick and choose piecemeal acreage. 38
B. Subleases
Texas courts decided two cases pertinent to subleases that deserve men-
tion. In Estes v. Wilson 39 the court simply held that when a landlord accepts
rent payments after knowledge of a sublease, a material issue of fact exists as
to whether the lessor has waived his statutory4 right to terminate for sublet-
ting without consent.41 In Bookkeepers Tax Service, Inc. v. National Cash
Register Co.42 a federal district court observed that the plaintiff-subtenants
could not claim the benefit of warranties made by the lessor to the tenants in
the original lease. 43 The court stated that no privity of contract existed be-
tween the original lessor and a sublessee under Texas law.44 The court also
noted that the sublessees could not recover from the original lessor even if he
breached lease covenants. 45
C. Effecting Termination or Surrender
Two cases reported during the survey period pertained to termination or
surrender. In Flores v. Rizik46 a commercial tenant vacated leased premises
without turning the keys over to the landlord or notifying the landlord of his
departure. The court held the tenant liable for damages allegedly caused by
vandals after he vacated the premises, stating that the building remained in
the tenant's legal possession until he gave notice of termination. 47 Responsi-
bility for damages accompanied legal possession.48
In Southmark Management Corp. v. Vick 49 a residential lease provided
that the tenant would be liable for a reletting fee if he failed to give written
notice thirty days before moving. In the final month of the lease term the
landlord sent a demand for surrender because of late payments. The tenant
then paid his rent through the last month and left. The appellate court held
that the landlord's demand letter and other conduct showing no intent to
37. Id. at 503.
38. Id.
39. 682 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (Vernon 1962) has been repealed, effective
January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.005 (Vernon 1984) (providing
that tenant cannot sublet without landlord's consent).
41. 682 S.W.2d at 715.
42. 598 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
43. Id. at 338.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 683 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
47. Id. at 116.
48. Id.
49. 692 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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continue the lease, coupled with the tenant's acquiescence, amounted to a
termination and acceptance of surrender.50 The termination destroyed the
landlord's right to the reletting fee under the lease.51 Thus, a landlord wish-
ing to sue on a lease should take care to avoid terminating it by writing or
conduct.
D. Remedies and Damages
The Supreme Court of Texas has held that, in the absence of definitive
lease language to the contrary, courts should not construe a lease to make a
tenant liable for unaccrued rent after termination, forfeiture, or re-entry of
the leased premises. 52 Several subsequent cases have followed or elaborated
on this holding. 53 Glasscock v. Console Drive Joint Venture54 has implicitly
done the same.
In Glasscock the lease permitted the lessor to terminate the lease or reen-
ter and relet and hold the lessee responsible for deficiencies from inability to
relet.55 The lessor sought to recover rentals accruing after he had termi-
nated the lease by a forcible detainer action. The court, without citing any
authority, stated that the lessor clearly considered the lease terminated and
that therefore he could not recover future rentals. 56 The court reversed the
trial judge57 who apparently did not know of the strict rule precluding the
recovery of damages after termination.
In Flores v. Rizik 58 the appellate court demonstrated that the perils facing
a tenant who fails to terminate equal those that confront a landlord who
inadvertently terminates. In Flores the court held a vacating tenant liable
50. Id. at 159-160.
51. Id.
52. Rohrt v. Kelly Mfg. Co., 162 Tex. 534, 537, 349 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1961).
53. See, e.g., Maida v. Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648, 652-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1971, no writ) (abandoning tenant sued on lease contract cannot claim credit for
excess of future rent payable under new lease over rent due under original lease); Meehan v.
Pickett, 463 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (landlord's
reference in letter to tenant to lease provision permitting declaration of forfeiture did not le-
gally declare forfeiture; landlord therefore was not limited to suit for rents due up to date of
letter); Johnson v. Golden Triangle Corp., 404 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no
writ) (letter to tenant giving notice of declaration of forfeiture if tenant failed to pay delinquent
rent did not equal a declaration of forfeiture precluding liability for future rent). The landlord
may bring a suit on the lease contract or for breach of the contract, but the landlord cannot do
both. 473 S.W.2d at 651. The landlord may give up remedies in the lease if it is terminated.
Id.
54. 675 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. The landlord may have a duty to relet to mitigate damages, but some authority sug-
gests that a landlord does not have a duty to mitigate damages unless the lease imposes that
duty. Metroplex Glass Center, Inc. v. Vantage Properties, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Other authority, however, suggests that a landlord has a
duty to mitigate damages by trying to procure a new tenant whenever the landlord has re-
entered the vacated premises. Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 288, 292-93 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
56. 675 S.W.2d at 593.
57. Id.
58. 683 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 46-48 for a discussion of this case.
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for damages caused by vandals after he failed to give notice and terminate. 59
The court stated that the measure of damages to the landlord's personalty
and equipment in the leasehold was the diminution in market value of the
items, 60 while the damage to the leasehold may equal the cost of repair un-
less the cost of repair is great or difficult to ascertain.
61
In Standard Container Corp. v. Dragon Realty62 the court held a holdover
tenant liable for a different measure of damages. The tenant had informed
the landlord of its desire to hold over, but the parties had not agreed on a
rental rate. The tenant stayed on the premises for approximately three
months without an agreement. The court held that the proper measure of
the landlord's damages was the reasonable market value of the use of the
land for the time the tenant held over. 63 The court did not discuss whether
this holding would apply to a holdover tenant in a declining rental market.
In Baugh v. Myers64 the court construed an assignee's liability for dam-
ages after the lessor prevailed in a suit for trespass to try title, presumably
for wrongful assignment. The court, without citing any authority, found the
lessor entitled to recover not only the fair market value of rent for the prem-
ises used by the assignee, but also for the assignee's profit from the portion of
the property that the assignee leased to others.65 No other cases during the
survey period addressed tenant liability for damages in a commercial
context. 66
In Mayfield v. Benavides67 the San Antonio court of appeals considered
trespasser liability for damages in a commercial context. An oil and gas
producer asserted that production from an existing well should not be
counted in production limits on certain acreage. Although the producer
knew that the lessors disagreed with his assertion, he drilled an additional
well on the acreage. The producer's drilling permit application named a
59. 683 S.W.2d at 115.
60. Id.
61. Id. The lessor failed to plead cost of repair as a measure of damages and therefore
could not recover that measure. The court, however, permitted evidence of the cost of repair
to go to the jury. Id. at 116.
62. 683 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Id. at 48. The lease in question provided, "holding over shall constitute and be con-
strued as a tenancy from month to month only, at a rental equal to the rental payable for the
last month of the term of this lease plus twenty per cent (20%) of such amount. The inclusion
of the preceding sentence shall not be construed as Landlord's permission for Tenant to hold
over." Id. at 47. The tenant argued that this language was tantamount to a liquidated dam-
ages clause for holdover, but the court disagreed. The court emphasized that the lease pro-
vided that the stated remedies supplemented those provided by law. Id. The court also found
that the clause in question implied that the landlord could deny permission to holdover, as it
had in this case. Id. at 46-47.
64. 694 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
65. Id. at 66.
66. In Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co., 747 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth
Circuit had an opportunity to instruct the district court on the calculation of damages for a
tenant's failure to clear agricultural land under a lease obligating the tenant to do so, but
instead merely stated that the district court must recompute damages on remand. The opinion
written by Judge Higginbotham focused almost entirely on the question of limitation periods.
Id. at 985.
67. 693 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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nonexistent lease. The court found that the producer was a trespasser in bad
faith even though no action was pending against him at the time of the drill-
ing. 68 The court therefore held the producer liable to the lessor for the value
of the production without any deduction for drilling or production costs. 69
In Barnstone v. Robinson70 the court held that a commercial tenant could
not obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) against a landlord if the
TRO changed the status quo.71 The court held that ordering payment of a
lower rent, as requested by the tenant under an unusual lease provision,
changed the status quo.72 The court noted that the tenant would have an
adequate legal remedy in damages if his proposed change in the rent calcula-
tions under the lease were correct. 73
In Conroy v. Manos74 the Dallas court of appeals considered a recurring
problem for landlords and their counsel: what to do with the possessions of
an evicted tenant who has not appeared to contest judgment or to claim his
belongings before their removal from the premises. The court decided the
Conroy case en banc. The case involved constitutional questions, drew two
dissenting opinions, 75 and may have influenced recent legislation concerning
writs of possession. 76
The Conroy lessor sued the tenant for default in rent payment, but the
tenant persuaded the justice of the peace to order application of her pet de-
posit to satisfy the overdue rent. 77 In the next month the lessor again sued
for failure to pay rent, and the tenant allowed the entry of a default judg-
ment against her.78 The lessor then obtained a writ of restitution, but the
constables could not find the tenant to serve it. The constables permitted
two of the lessor's employees to remove the tenant's property and place it on
the public way; the apartment manager watched as vandals and thieves took
it away. In the first suit the tenant received notice that her property could be
removed, and presumably she knew of that potential consequence.
The tenant contended that the removal violated her constitutional rights
by depriving her of her property without due process. 79 The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Guillot, held that the constable and the apartment
manager's employees acted within the law because the tenant had full oppor-
tunity to appear and defend the suit and the notice of suit stated that the
landlord sought possession of the apartment. 80 Furthermore, the writ ex-
68. Id. at 504-05.
69. Id. at 506.
70. 678 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd).
71. Id. at 563.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 679 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Dallas 194, writ refd n.r.e.).
75. Id. at 127 (Stephens, J., dissenting, joined by Vance and Allen, JJ.); id. at 130 (Whi-
tham, J., dissenting, joined by Storey and Stewart, JJ.).
76. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061 (Vernon Supp. 1986); infra text accompanying
notes 140-54.
77. 679 S.W.2d at 125.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 126. The tenant asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
80. 679 S.W.2d at 126.
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plicitly called for the constable to enter the building so that "peaceable pos-
session thereof [be] restore[d] to the said plaintiff .... "81 The majority
stated that the landlord had no duty to preserve or store the tenant's prop-
erty.82 The court's statement may seem harsh, but landlords repeatedly face
the question of what to do with the property of a defaulting tenant who may
never return to the premises or repay the costs of storage.83 Frequently, the
costs of packing, hauling, and storage for even a short time would exceed the
market value of the tenant's belongings.
Justice Stephens' dissent focused on the absence of notice to the tenant
that her failure to appear and contest the second suit would result in the loss
of her personal belongings.84 Justice Whitham, dissenting, argued that
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 74985 and 75586 require execution of writs of
restitution by the same procedures applicable to other writs of execution.
These procedures require offering personal property for sale on the premises
where it is taken or at the courthouse door after posting proper public notice
for ten days. 87 Justice Whitham did not address any differences among writs
of execution, possession, or restitution. Neither did he state where the land-
lord should store the property during the notice period or discuss the land-
lord's potential liabilities for improper sale or the sale of property exempt
from execution. In light of the current state of the law, a landlord should
probably avoid any involvement with the tenant's property except for re-
moval, and possibly statutory sale.
E. Attorney's Fees
Two cases during the survey period discussed recoverability of attorney's
fees. In Byler v. Garcia88 the court pointed out that a residential tenant su-
ing for return of a deposit need not rely solely on article 2226 of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes for recovery of attorney's fees. 89 A tenant could also
rely on former articles 5236c, d, and e. 90 In Bookkeepers Tax Services, Inc. v.
81. Id. at 125.
82. Id. at 127.
83. It is the author's personal experience while representing both residential landlords and
tenants that tenants often leave the premises and their belongings without giving notice of
when they shall return. If they do return, they do not think that the landlord should have
charged them for the cost of storing the belongings. For the landlord to sell the belongings is
potentially perilous, since all or some may be exempt from execution, or the sale may not
comply with the law. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 54 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1986).
84. 679 S.W.2d at 130.
85. TEX. R. Civ. P. 749.
86. Id. 755.
87. 679 S.W.2d at 131 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 649, 650).
88. 685 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 12-0. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971) has been repealed,
effective September 1, 1985, and recodified without substantive change at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001-.006 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (providing for recovery of attorney's fees
in certain situations including contract claims).
90. 685 S.W.2d at 120. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236c, d, e have been repealed,
effective January 1, 1984, and recodified without substantive change at TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 91.002, 54.041-.045, 92.001, .102-.109 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1986) (providing for
recovery of attorney's fees in certain situations involving residential landlord's liens, security
deposit refunds, interruption of utilities, and exclusion of tenants).
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National Cash Register Co. 91 a federal district court awarded attorney's fees
against the plaintiffs-tenants and their counsel for making groundless argu-
ments.92 The court stated that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1193 makes
an attorney's signature on a pleading his guarantee that, after reasonable
investigation, he believes the suit has a sufficient factual basis and legal
justification. 94
F Guarantors and Sureties
In Glasscock v. Console Drive Joint Venture95 the court construed the obli-
gations of a guarantor or surety for a tenant under a lease contract. The
landlord received cash for part of the rent the tenant owed him and a prom-
issory note from the tenant for the remainder. When the tenant defaulted on
the note, the lessor sued the tenant and the tenant's guarantor. The court
observed that a contract by which the principal secures an extension of time
to pay releases the surety's obligations if the surety is not a party to the
extension. 96 The court, however, found no Texas precedent on the effect of
an extension of time to pay part of an obligation.97 The court decided that
the extension discharged the guarantor's obligation to the extent of the rent-
als included in the note. 98 The court did not discuss whether payment of the
other rentals by the tenant in partial settlement discharged the guarantor or
affected the guarantor's remaining obligation.
G. Options to Purchase or Renew
In Estes v. Wilson99 the court found that certain lease clauses requiring the
payment of taxes and insurance were preconditions to the exercise of an op-
tion to purchase and not mere covenants for which a damage suit constituted
a proper remedy. 100 The court noted that courts generally construe option
contracts against the optionee because the contracts operate to benefit
him. 10' In Tye v. Apperson'0 2 the Fort Worth court of appeals reached a
different result. The Fort Worth court of appeals ordered specific perform-
ance of an option to purchase that was expressly "conditioned upon the true
and full performance of... Lessee's obligations," even though the trial court
found that the lessee had violated the lease in several respects. 103 The option
agreement provided that, in the event of the lessee's default, the agreement
91. 598 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
92. Id. at 340.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
94. 598 F. Supp. at 340.
95. 675 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
96. Id. at 591-92.
97. Id. at 592.
98. Id.
99. 682 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 715.
101. Id.
102. 689 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted).
103. Id. at 321-22.
[Vol. 40
REAL PROPERTY. LANDLORD & TENANT
would terminate at the optionor's election. 104 The court found that this pro-
vision implied a right to notice of the optionor's election to terminate as a
result of the lessee's violations of the lease.105 A key difference between the
Estes and Tye cases may be that in Estes the option strictly construed against
the optionee was a separate agreement, while in Tye the option construed
against the landlord was part of the lease contract. Optionees should be
advised to make their options part of the lease.
H. Leases Involving a County
In Jack v. State10 6 the court found a lease of county land to a developer
void. Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 1577107 prescribes the manner in
which a county must make conveyances.10 8 Since the lease did not comply
with article 1577, the assignee acquired no rights under the lease and none of
the parties could bring suit on the lease. 109
I. Waiver
Estes v. Wilson, 110 discussed above, 1 ' also dealt with the subject of
waiver. 12 The Estes lessee argued that the lessor waived her statutory
right113 to approve a sublease by accepting payments from the subtenant.
The court disagreed, stating that waiver required an intent to waive a
right.1 4 The lessor complained continually about the subletting, evidencing
no intent to accept the sublease.115 The court found no "clear, unequivocal
and decisive" act that might have proved a waiver. 1 6
J. Litigating the Landlord-Tenant Case
In Pharis v. Culler 1 7 a lessor complained about the refusal of a county
court to dismiss an allegedly improper appeal. Instead of the correct forcible
entry and detainer appeal bond, the tenant had sent a criminal misdemeanor
appeal bond to the judge. The judge approved the appeal bond one day after
the judgment, and the bond was not filed until after the period for appeal
had expired. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the judge had
timely accepted the bond for filing and that the tenant could amend the bond
104. Id. at 322.
105. Id. at 323.
106. 694 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1577 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
108. 694 S.W.2d at 397.
109. Id.
110. 682 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
112. 682 S.W.2d at 713-15.
113. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (Vernon 1962) has been repealed, effective
January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.005 (Vernon 1984) (providing
that tenant cannot sublet without landlord's consent).
114. 682 S.W.2d at 714.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 677 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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under rule 430,118 because the Supreme Court of Texas has held that a
court's power to amend the appeal bond is extremely broad. 119
In Lawyers Civil Process, Inc. v. State120 the Dallas court of appeals held
that private process servers could not execute such popular landlord reme-
dies as writs of attachment, writs of sequestration, or distress warrants, but,
under rule 21 a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,121 could serve notices
of the writs as provided by rules 598a, 613, and 700a 12 2 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. 123
Several reported cases indicate that a lawyer who lacks sufficient experi-
ence, fees or resources to fully prosecute a landlord-tenant appeal should
refrain from attempting to do so. In these cases findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law were improperly filed or not filed at all, and the appellate court
had to affirm the judge rendered by the trial court if the judgment could be
sustained on any reasonable legal theory that found support in the
evidence. 124
K Statutory Rights of Residential Tenants
The cases reported during the Survey period did not significantly modify
or reinterpret the statutory rights of residential tenants, but the cases merit
brief mention because they illustrate a tenant's statutory arsenal against a
landlord. In Alltex Construction, Inc. v. Alareksoussi125 the court found the
landlord liable for attorney's fees and treble damages under section
92.109(d) of the Texas Property Code 126 because the landlord retained the
tenant's security deposit in bad faith.' 27 The Dallas court of appeals noted
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 430 has been repealed, effective April 1, 1984, and replaced by id.
363a, which provides that "[o]n motion to dismiss an appeal . . . for a defect of substance or
form in any bond... given as security for costs, the appellate court may allow the filing of a
new bond ... in the trial court on such terms as the appellate court may prescribe."
119. 677 S.W.2d at 170. The Texas Supreme Court has held that rule 430 should be liber-
ally construed to carry out its purpose. "If the appellant files any sort of instrument that is
intended to be a bond and to invoke the appellate jurisdiction, the instrument may, on timely
request, be awarded to cure any defect of either form or substance." Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Arkla Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. 1975).
120. 690 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
122. Id. 598a, 613, 700a.
123. 690 S.W.2d at 943-44.
124. See, e.g., Baugh v. Myers, 694 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ) (appellant requested findings but failed to complain within five days after end of judge's
time to file findings); W.H. McCrory & Co. v. Contractors Equip. & Supply Co., 691 S.W.2d
717, 720 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (party failed to request submission of
special issues regarding application of statute of frauds); Tye v. Apperson, 689 S.W.2d 320,
322 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted) (because trial court did not file findings of
fact or conclusions of law, appellate court must affirm if judgment can be affirmed under any
legal theory supported by the record); Estes v. Wilson, 682 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (appealing party failed to submit special issues or request filing of
a statement of findings of fact or conclusions of law); see also Walker v. Horine, 695 S.W.2d
572, 579 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (litigant failed to protect appeal by filing
transcript).
125. 685 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.109(d) (Vernon 1984).
127. 685 S.W.2d at 95-96.
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that no statutory presumption of bad faith arose because the lessor timely
provided itemized reasons for retaining the deposit, as required by the stat-
ute. 12 8 The court nevertheless based a finding of bad faith on evidence that
the landlord knew that the tenant was not entirely responsible for the item-
ized damage, on the vagueness of the itemized list, and on the arbitrariness
of amounts charged for damages.12 9
In Southmark Management Corp. v. Vick 130 the court pointed out that a
landlord cannot keep any portion of a security deposit to cover normal wear
and soil.131 A tenant can leave a normal amount of wear and soil and still
recover his deposit.1 32 The court did not explain what constitutes a normal
amount.
In Ackerman v. Little1 33 the court held that, under section 6(a) of article
5236e of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, a landlord has no more than 30
days after receiving a tenant's forwarding address to either refund the de-
posit or furnish an itemized list of reasons for keeping the deposit. 1 34 In
Ackerman the landlord failed to rebut the statutory presumption establishing
that he acted in bad faith in failing to return the tenant's deposit within
thirty days. The appellate court, however, apparently considered ignorance
of the law to be pertinent proof of the landlord's good faith. 135 In Minor v.
Adams 136 the court found the landlord not liable for damages for bad faith
because the landlord reasonably thought that the lease complied with section
92.103 of the Texas Property Code.' 37 Section 92.103(b) permits a landlord
to require that a tenant give advance written notice of surrender in order to
obtain a refund of his deposit; however, only notice requirements "under-
lined or printed in conspicuous bold print in the lease" are enforceable.
1 38
The court held, however, that the Minor landlord could not keep the ten-
ant's deposit because the lease did not require advance written notice of sur-
render in both conspicuous and bold print.' 39
128. Id. at 94. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.103(a), 92.104(c) (Vernon 1984) require that
the landlord furnish a written statement within 30 days after the tenant vacates the property.
129. Id. at 96.
130. 692 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 160.
132. Id.
133. 679 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
134. Id. at 75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986), has
been repealed, effective January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.103,
.107 (Vernon 1984), which has been interpreted to the same effect. See Minor v. Adams, 694
S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (landlord must refund de-
posit within 30 days of receiving forwarding address).
135. 679 S.W.2d at 74 (noting that, in finding bad faith, trial court could disbelieve testi-
mony of lessor who was a real estate agent that he was ignorant of the law). The maxim that
ignorance of the law should be no excuse has been so often repeated that it does not merit
citation.
136. 694 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
137. Id. at 152; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.103(b) (Vernon 1984).
138. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.103(b) (Vernon 1984).
139. 694 S.W.2d at 150.
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L. Legislation During the 1985 Session
1. Remedies; Writ of Possession. The most significant statutory change
during this session codifies the Dallas court of appeals decision in Conroy v.
Manos.140 Section 24.0061 was added to chapter 24 of the Texas Property
Code to provide for issuance of writs of possession.' 4' Section 24.0061(c)
provides that the writ of possession shall order the officer executing the writ
to return possession to the lessor. 142 The executing officer may physically
remove the tenant and may supervise removal of the tenant's personal prop-
erty from the leased premises. 143 If it is not raining, sleeting, or snowing, the
officer may place the removed property outside nearby but not on a side-
walk, passageway, street, or parking area. 144 The writ of possession also
permits an officer to hire a bonded warehouseman to store the removed
property, but does not require him to do so,' 45 and authorizes the use of
reasonable force in executing the writ. 146 In addition, the new section per-
mits a successful tenant in a forcible entry and detainer action to recover
costs, and, when appropriate, attorney's fees. 147
2. Remedies, Seizure of Property. The legislature also amended chapter 54
of the Texas Property Code to restrict landlords' rights to seize and sell a
tenant's personal property. 148 The new provisions prohibit sale or other dis-
position of property seized to satisfy landlord's liens unless authorized in a
written lease.149 The landlord must also give written notice by certified mail
thirty days before a proposed sale. 150 After seizure the landlord must leave
in a conspicuous place in the premises notice of entry, an itemized list of the
property removed, and a statement of the rent owed and that the property
will be returned on payment of the rent. 51 The landlord cannot charge the
tenant for removing or storing property seized unless the written lease per-
mits the charge.152 A landlord's lien cannot attach to children's toys,153 no
matter how costly, as the legislature believed that landlords exercising lien
remedies attached children's toys too often. 154
140. 679 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 74-87.
141. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 24.0061 is effective
for execution of judgments entered on or after September 1, 1985.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 24.0061(c).
144. Id. § 24.0061(c)(3).
145. Id. § 24.0061(d)(2).
146. Id. § 24.0061(0.
147. Id. § 24.0061(a).
148. Id. § 54.044 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The amended section is effective August 26, 1985.
149. Id. § 54.045(a). The written lease must also authorize seizure of the tenant's property.
Id. § 54.044(a).
150. Id. § 54.045(b). The content of the notice is also prescribed. Id. § 54.045(b)(l)-(3).
151. Id. § 54.044(b).
152. Id. § 54.044(c).
153. Id. § 54.042(13). Other property previously exempted from attachment by landlords'
liens includes clothing, family pictures, beds, and food. See id. § 54.042(1)-(12), (14), (15).
154. See Senate Bill Analysis for S.B. 1211 (1985).
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3. Utilities Services and Submetering. The legislature made important
changes in laws regulating landlords' providing and submetering of utilities.
Amended article 1446d of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes limited the appli-
cation of utility submetering requirements to apartment houses, rooms in
apartment houses, or mobile homes in mobile home parks; thus precluding
submetering by lessors taking only occasional or transient borders.155 The
amended article also permits utility submetering for water consumption
under rules to be promulgated by the Public Utility Commission of Texas. '5 6
Amended article 6053 extended gas metering requirements to apartment
houses and apartment units, as defined in the Act, making the rules applica-
ble to virtually all landlords. 157 Article 6053, as amended, requires that the
Commission promulgate rules for fairly allocating gas consumption among
units and for prohibiting sale or resale of gas for a profit. 15 8 The landlord
must keep records of submetering and make the records available for inspec-
tion by residents.' 59
New article 1446f applies to allocation of all utility services and imposes
five requirements: (1) that the lease describe the method of allocating central
system utility costs to each tenant; (2) that the lease contain a statement of
the average monthly utility costs for each unit; (3) that the landlord not
resell for a profit; (4) that the landlord keep adequate records of unit con-
sumption; (5) that the landlord make all records available for inspection by
tenants. 160 The tenant may recover treble damages for any overcharges plus
one month's rent, attorney's fees and court costs if the landlord violates any
Commission rule regarding submetering or allocating central system utility
costs. 161 The landlord, however, shall not be liable if he proves his violation
was a "good faith, unintentional mistake."'162
4. Miscellaneous Legislation. The legislature amended section 24.005(a) of
the Texas Property Code to require that all landlords operating under any
lease agreement give tenants written notice to vacate three days before filing
a forcible entry and detainer (FED) suit. 163 The landlord and tenant may
agree otherwise, but only in a written lease. 164 The notice to vacate now also
serves as a demand for possession for purposes of acquiring relief in an FED
action under section 24.002 of the Property Code. 165
To recover attorney's fees, a landlord must still give at least ten days'
written notice to vacate before filing an FED suit, but, under the amended
155. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446(d), § 1(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
156. Id. § 3.
157. Id. art. 6053, § la(a)(l), (2).
158. Id. § la(b).
159. Id. § la(b)(2).
160. Id. art. 1466f, § 2.
161. Id. art. 144 6 g.
162. Id.
163. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The amended section is
effective September 1, 1985. Before amendment the section applied only to leases for periods
longer than week to week. Id. § 24.005(a) (Vernon 1984).
164. Id. § 24.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
165. Id. §§ 24.002, .005(d).
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section 24.006, when the landlord's right to recover attorney's fees is speci-
fied in the notice or in the written lease, then the prevailing party, either
landlord or tenant, may recover attorney fees. 166 Section 24.009 permits
agents who are not lawyers to represent parties to FED suits in justice
courts. 167
Appeal from the final judgment of a county court on the issue of posses-
sion in an FED action is permitted only for residential premises. 168
Amended section 24.007 also requires the filing of a supersedeas bond within
ten days of judgment to effect a stay of the county court judgment. 169
Amended section 54.021 permits a lessor leasing only part of a building for
non-residential use to have a commercial landlord's preference lien.' 70
II. MORTGAGES
In 1963 the Texas Legislative Council began a recodification program re-
sulting in part in the Texas Property Code, which became effective January
1, 1984. The recodification was intended to make the law of real property
more accessible and understandable without making substantive changes. ' 7'
In most survey period cases the courts review and analyze the prior statu-
tory laws of the state, make reference to the Texas Property Code, and as-
sume no legislative intent to change the substance of the law. 172
A. Notice
In Medley v. Medley173 the Corpus Christi court of appeals considered the
effect of a prior recorded deed on the right of a subsequent grantee. The
plaintiff sought partition and removal of a cloud on title. Two of seven chil-
dren who had inherited interests in a tract of land executed deeds to the
plaintiff in the spring of 1980. In the spring of 1981 the same two children
executed deeds to the defendant. The defendant recorded these deeds on
June 16, 1981, four months before the first grantee recorded his deeds on
October 21, 1981. Priority between the first and second grantee was gov-
erned by Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 6627,174 recodified at section
13.001 of the Texas Property Code. 175
The court noted that the Recordation Law of 1836 did not require that the
166. Id. § 24.006(d). Before amendment the section permitted recovery of fees only by the
landlord and only if the tenant had held over after notice to vacate and commencement of suit.
Id. § 24.006 (Vernon 1984).
167. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.009 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
168. Id. § 24.007.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 54.021.
171. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.001 (Vernon 1984).
172. See Medley v. Medley, 683 S.W.2d 877, 878 n.2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ) (no legislative intent to change substantive law).
173. 683 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
174. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1986) has been repealed,
effective January 1, 1984, and recodified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 1984).
175. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 1984).
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second grantee pay value and be without notice.' 7 6 In 1840 the legislature
limited the benefits of the recording statute to second grantees without no-
tice who had paid consideration. 7 7 In a suit by a prior grantee seeking to
deny the benefit of the recording statute to a subsequent grantee holding a
prior recorded deed, the subsequent grantee has historically borne the bur-
den of proving he acquired his title for valuable consideration and without
notice of the prior unrecorded instrument, the court stated.' 78 The court
noted that because of this historical placement of the burden of proof, the
court would treat the invocation of article 6627 as an affirmative defense. 79
The defendant was required to produce evidence that raised an issue of fact
regarding each element of the affirmative defense.' 80 Real estate litigators
should therefore plead the current recording statute, section 13.001 of the
Property Code,' 8 as an affirmative defense in their responsive pleadings in
order to avoid a waiver of the defense.
In Cooksey v. Sinder 82 the Texas Supreme Court stated that a purchaser
is charged with notice of the contents of deeds that were necessary compo-
nents of his chain of title.183 The court therefore held that the failure of a
prior owner to file a separate lien instrument did not inure to the benefit of a
subsequent purchaser.' 8 4 In Cooksey the prior owner, Cooksey, sought to
foreclose on a vendor's lien. The purchasers had executed a promissory note
and Cooksey had executed a warranty deed with vendor's lien providing that
Cooksey retained superior title until the purchasers paid the note in full.
This deed was properly filed in the county deed records before the purchas-
ers resold the property. The purchasers subsequently sold that property by
an assumption deed to relatives who sold part of the property to an unre-
lated person. The original purchasers defaulted on their note to Cooksey,
and Cooksey sued. The district court granted judgment on the note but de-
nied foreclosure of the lien. The Texas Supreme Court held that the vendor
could foreclose as a matter of law if she refuted one of the essential elements
of the innocent purchaser defense.' 8 5 The vendor had to prove that the own-
ers did not purchase in good faith and did not purchase for value.' 8 6 The
latter requirement can be substituted for the requirement that the owners
had legal notice of the lien.' 8 7 Because Cooksey's deed reserving a vendor's
lien was properly recorded within the chain of title, the landowners had legal
176. 683 S.W.2d at 879; see Law of Dec. 20, 1836, § 40, 1836 Laws of the Republic 156, 1
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1216 (1898).
177. 683 S.W.2d at 879 (citing Ryle v. Davidson, 102 Tex. 227, 231-32, 115 S.W. 28, 29
(1909)).
178. 683 S.W.2d at 879 (citing Dowson v. Bluhm, 252 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1952, no writ)).
179. 683 S.W.2d at 879.
180. Id.
181. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 1984).
182. 682 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1984).




187. Id. (citing Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 473, 98 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1936)).
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notice of the lien. 188 They therefore could not successfully assert the inno-
cent purchaser defense to foreclosure of the lien but took subject to the
lien.' 89
B. Waiver of Notice of Intent to Accelerate
In Real Estate Exchange, Inc. v. Bacci'90 the Houston court of appeals
considered whether the maker of a note could by the terms of the-note ex-
pressly waive his right to notice from the note holder of intention to acceler-
ate. In Bacci the makers of the note purchased an apartment complex and
signed a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust on the property. The
makers often made their payments late and their bank returned one check
due to insufficient funds. The holders notified each maker in writing that
they would not accept any more late payments. When the holders did not
receive the next payment on time, they proceeded to foreclose. The holders
received the payment six days later and returned it with written notice that
the note had been accelerated and that a foreclosure sale was pending. The
note contained the following provision:
In the event default is made in the payment of the principal of this note,
... then the legal holder hereof shall have the option without demand
or notice to the maker . . . to declare this note immediately due and
payable and may thereupon foreclose the liens given to secure its
payment. 191
The district court temporarily enjoined the foreclosure, but the court of
appeals reversed, finding that the provision in the note was sufficient to con-
stitute a waiver by the makers of prior notice of acceleration. 192 The court
of appeals stated, "[a]lthough this acceleration is optional rather than auto-
matic, the note expressly provides that the option may be exercised by the
holder without demand or notice to the maker."' 193 The court distinguished
the 1982 case of Ogden v. Gibralter Savings Association.194 In Ogden the
Texas Supreme Court considered whether the holder of a promissory note
containing an optional acceleration provision must notify the maker of the
holder's intention to exercise the option. The deed of trust in Ogden con-
tained a provision declaring that upon default the balance due on the under-
lying note should "at the option of the holder or holders thereof,
immediately become due and payable ... ."195 When the maker defaulted,
the holder gave notice to the maker that "failure to cure such breach on or
before [particular date] may result in acceleration of the sums secured by the
Deed of Trust and sale of the property . ,, 196 The Ogden court found this
188. 682 S.W.2d at 253.
189. Id.
190. 676 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
191. Id. at 441.
192. Id. at 440-41.
193. Id. at 441 (emphasis in the original).
194. 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982).
195. Id. at 233.
196. Id. (emphasis in original).
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notice insufficient because it merely restated that the holder might exercise
its option to accelerate, not that the holder was actually exercising that op-
tion. 197 The Bacci court reached a contrary result, stating that if the maker
of the note expressly waives notice, notice is not required.' 98
Several post-Ogden decisions focused on waiver of notice of the intent to
accelerate. In Chapa v. Herbster'99 the Tyler court of appeals held that a
waiver of notice of intent to accelerate in a note or deed of trust dispensed
with the requirement. 200 In Bodiford v. Parker20 1 the Fort Worth court of
appeals found that a provision in a deed of trust that "the entire indebted-
ness hereby secured ... may, at the option of the Beneficiary .... be immedi-
ately matured and become due and payable without demand or notice of any
character . . ." was ineffective to waive notice of intent to accelerate but
merely waived notice that the debt had been accelerated. 20 2 As the Bacci
court emphasized, however, if by the term of the note the maker expressly
waives the right to notice of acceleration, then notice of acceleration is un-
necessary. 20 3 Because Texas courts disagree as to the effectiveness of clauses
waiving notice of intent and acceleration, real estate practitioners should
draft waivers of acceleration specifically, with all provisions separated from
any other attempted waiver. The drafter should use the express word "ac-
celerate" to refer to waivers of notice of intent to accelerate as well as to
refer to notice that the debt has been accelerated.
C. Notice of Nonjudicial Foreclosure
In Mitchell v. Texas Commerce Bank-Irving2°4 the Fort Worth court of
appeals considered notice requirements under section 51.002 of the Texas
Property Code, which provides for that is commonly referred to as nonjudi-
cial foreclosure. 20 5 In Mitchell the mortgagee sued for a deficiency judgment
and the mortgagor counterclaimed for wrongful foreclosure. The bank sent
notice of the sale to the makers at their old address even though the bank
197. Id. at 234.
198. 676 S.W.2d at 441.
199. 653 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
200. Id. at 601.
201. 651 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
202. Id. at 339. Two dissenting judges considered the provision to be a clear waiver of
notice of intent to accelerate. Id. at 340-41 (Jordon, J., dissenting).
203. 676 S.W.2d at 441. See Cortez v. Brownsville Nat'l Bank, 664 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (the language "Each Maker, Surety and Endorser waives
Notice, Presentment for Payment, Demand for Payment and Acceleration of Maturity, and
protest . . ." was effective to waive notice of intent and acceleration). The Cortez holding
appears incorrect and drafters should not rely on it. The waiver of the "Demand for Payment
and Acceleration of Maturity" may constitute a waiver of notice of acceleration but does not
include a waiver of intent to accelerate. See Slivka v. Swiss Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d 939, 940-
41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (express waiver effective); Valley v. Patterson, 614
S.W.2d 867, 872 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (same); Burnett v. Manufacturer's
Hanover Trust Co., 593 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.)
(same); Whalen v. Etheridge, 428 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (same).
204. 680 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984).
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had their new address on file. The makers received the forwarded notice a
few days before the sale and they came to the sale. Section 51.002 provides
that, at least twenty-one days before the sale, the holder of the debt must
mail a certified notice of the sale addressed to the debtor's most recent ad-
dress as shown in the holder's records. 20 6 Noncompliance with section
51.002 can invalidate the sale.20 7 The Fort Worth court of appeals stated
that the purpose of the notice statute is to provide a minimum level of pro-
tection for the debtor. 208 The court reasoned that sending notice to the
wrong address results in the debtor receiving less pre-sale preparation time,
defeating the purpose of the statutory notice provision. 209 The court held
that the mortgagors' receipt of actual notice of foreclosure and their pres-
ence at the sale did not preclude finding that they suffered harm as a result of
the insufficient notice due to the mailing of the notice to an old address. 210
The court further noted that the trustee may allow a purchaser some time to
obtain cash for the purchase. If, however, after other prospective purchasers
have dispersed the purchaser cannot obtain the cash, the trustee cannot re-
convene the sale without further advertisement or notice.21' The court
therefore found the trustee's sale later the same day and without further
notice invalid.212
In Johnson v. First Southern Properties, Inc.2 13 the Houston court of ap-
peals considered nonjudicial foreclosure under section 51.002 of the Texas
Property Code and related notice requirements. 21 4 In Johnson an individual
purchased a condominium apartment subject to covenants and conditions in
documents filed in the county records. One of these documents obligated all
co-owners to contribute their proportionate share of certain common ex-
penses and provided that the homeowners' council had a lien on each apart-
ment for any unpaid assessments. The homeowners' council was authorized
to enforce the lien through nonjudicial foreclosure; "co-owner[s] ...ex-
pressly grant[ed] to the Board a power of sale in connection with said
lien."' 215 The purchaser failed to make monthly maintenance payments,
foreclosure occurred and a third party purchased the property. The original
206. Id.
207. 680 S.W.2d at 682 (citing Lido Int'l, Inc. v. Lambeth, 611 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex.
1981)).
208. 680 S.W.2d at 682.
209. Id.
210. Id. The bank argued that mailing the notice to an incorrect address should not invali-
date the sale. The court, however, distinguished the cases relied on by the bank because they
did not involve delay in delivery of the notice. Id. at 683. See Ogden v. Gibralter Sav. Ass'n,
620 S.W.2d 926, 929-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 640
S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982) (wrong post office box number and street address caused no delay);
Hausmann v. Texas Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 585 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mailing notice to actual residence rather than post office box listed as more
recent address caused no delay).
211. 680 S.W.2d at 683.
212. Id. (citing Clearman v. Graham, 4 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1928), writ dism'd per curiam, 14 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929)).
213. 687 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984).
215. 687 S.W.2d at 401.
[Vol. 40
REAL PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT
purchaser sued to have the foreclosure sale set aside, but the trial court up-
held the sale. The Houston court of appeals also held the foreclosure sale
valid. 216 The aggrieved condominium owner argued that the condominium
was his homestead and that the forced sale for payments of the monthly
maintenance fees violated his constitutional homestead protections. 217 The
court stated "[t]he shelter of a homestead is not unassailable. Rather, a
right, such as a lien, may prevail over a homestead claim if such right exists
before the land becomes a homestead. '218 Creation of a homestead requires
intent to claim the property as a homestead and concurrent usage of the
property. 219 When usage does not begin until after the inception of intent,
the owner may waive his homestead claim during the intervening period. 220
The court concluded that since the purchaser signed the purchase closing
papers more than two weeks before moving into the condominium, the in-
terim period rule applied. 221 The deed and the deed of trust provided that
the purchasor took the property subject to the recorded documents, which
contained provisions creating the homeowners' council's assessment lien.
These provisions constituted a prior relinquishment of the purchaser's home-
stead claim. 222 The court then applied the rationale of Cooksey v. Sinder223
and held that the condominium owner had legal notice of the assessment lien
expressed in the validly recorded documents, and he therefore took title to
the property subject to the lien.224 The assessment lien constituted a valid
pre-existing debt that overcame the homestead claim.225
In Mercer v. Daoran Corp. 226 a senior lienholder's 1975 deed of trust omit-
ted to recite that it renewed and extended a lien filed in 1974. A junior
lienholder filed a judgment lien in early 1975, before the senior lienholder
had filed his 1975 deed of trust. Both lienholders later foreclosed. The court
addressed the issue of whether the foreclosure of the deed of trust lien cut off
the rights of the judgment creditor. The trial court awarded summary judg-
ment to the purchaser at the deed of trust foreclosure sale; the appellate
court affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 227 The
216. Id.
217. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3839 (Vernon
1966) (repealed, effective January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002
(Vernon Supp. 1986)).
218. 687 S.W.2d at 401 (citing Miles Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Brubaker, 649 S.W.2d 791,
793 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Ditto, 566
S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Savell v. Flint, 347
S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ rerd n.r.e.)).
219. 687 S.W.2d at 401 (citing Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
220. 687 S.W.2d at 401 (citing Savell v. Flint, 347 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
221. 687 S.W.2d at 402.
222. Id.
223. Id.; Cooksey, 682 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1984); see supra notes 182-89 and accompanying
text.
224. 687 S.W.2d at 402.
225. Id.
226. 676 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1984).
227. Id. at 582.
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court held that since the 1974 deed of trust was on record, the judgment
creditor acquired his interest with knowledge of the prior lien and would be
bound by any valid renewal and extension agreement even if not filed of
record. 228 The Texas Supreme Court further noted that although a subroga-
tion might exist, 229 a renewal and extension was not proved. 230
The court applied article 5522 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which
has been recodified in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code at sec-
tions 16.036 and 16.037.231 Article 5522 required record filing of a signed
and acknowledged contract of extension in order to keep a lien in force. 232
The Texas Supreme Court found the language in the 1976 deed of trust in-
sufficient to renew and extend the senior lienholder's 1974 lien. 233 The 1975
deed of trust did not mention the 1974 note and lien or state that it renewed
and extended anything. The court held that the 1975 deed of trust did not
qualify as an article 5522 contract of extension.2 34 As one commentator has
observed,
The Mercer case illustrates the importance of renewing and extending a
mortgage within four years after the maturity date, and then filing the
extension of record. The extension agreement, whether in the form of
an extension or a new note and deed of trust, should make a reference
to the mortgage it is extending (amount, date, parties, recording infor-
228. Id.
229. As one commentator has written,
[q]uery why equitable subrogation alone would not have sufficed to achieve pri-
ority under holdings such as Houston Investment Bankers Corp. v. First City
Bank of Highland Village, 640 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1982, no writ). The answer may lie in the fact that the judgment lien was re-
corded prior to the 1975 deed of trust. In such a case, equitable subrogation
may not work and the new lender may need to obtain a specific assignment of
the prior lien. See Lewis v. Investors Say. Ass'n, 411 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1967, no writ). Would a blanket subrogation clause like the one
found in the deed of trust in this case work even without an assignment? Per-
haps this question will be answered in subsequent developments in this case.
Recent Real Property Decisions, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 215, 340 (1985).
230. 676 S.W.2d at 581.
231. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5522 (Vernon 1958). Article 5522 has been re-
pealed, effective September 1, 1985, and replaced by TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.036-.037 (Vernon Pam. 1986). Article 5522 authorized the owner of the land and the
holder of the note to "at any time enter into a valid agreement renewing and extending the
debt and lien, so long as it does not prejudice the rights of lien holders or purchasers subse-
quent to the date such liens became barred of record .... " The third party who acquired the
and after the 1975 lienholder's foreclosure sale contended that even if the 1975 deed of trust
proved insufficient as a contract of extension under article 5522, a valid extension agreement
existed between the parties. The court noted that:
[t]he rule is well established that a junior lien holder who acquires his lien when
the debt securing a first lien is not barred, and does not appear of record to be
barred, is bound by an extension agreement between the owner of the land and
the holder of the first lien, provided the contract of extension is sufficient be-
tween the parties thereto.
676 S.W.2d at 582 (quoting W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Terrell, 171 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1943, writ refd)).
232. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5522, recodified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.036-.037 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
233. Id.
234. 676 S.W.2d at 581.
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mation and property description) and should expressly state that the
prior mortgage is being extended to a certain future date. 235
In Lyons v. Montgomery236 the purchaser apparently knew of the risks
attending a purchase of property subject to an existing deed of trust contain-
ing a due on sale clause. The purchaser knew that the holder of the note had
the legal right to accelerate the amount due and that the purchaser could
lose the property through foreclosure proceedings. 237 The court found that
legally sufficient notice of the due on sale clause was given to the purchaser
by the title policy, which described the deed of trust and its recordation. 238
The court stated further that the purpose of a title policy is to provide pur-
chasers notice of the existence of instruments affecting the property, not to
explain in detail the terms and implications of those instruments. 239 If every
title exception in a title policy set forth the details of every pertinent instru-
ment the title policy would resemble an abstract of title, noted the court.24°
III. LIENS
A. Homestead
In Stewart v. Clark24' the Corpus Christi court of appeals stated that liens
on homesteads must comply with the Texas Constitution. 242 Under the con-
stitution a lienor may foreclose on homestead property only to pay for: (1) a
purchase money lien; (2) taxes due on the homestead property; and (3) work
and materials used to construct improvements on the property. 243 The Stew-
art plaintiff had a mechanic's and materialman's lien on a home owned by
defendants, two single adults. The defendants were joint tenants. One de-
fendant had orally authorized the plaintiff to begin repairs of hurricane dam-
age to the home. The parties never executed a written contract. The district
court declared the lien null and void. The court of appeals affirmed, finding
that the applicable constitutional provision, as amended, required that asser-
tion of a lien for improvements against a single adult's homestead be
235. Id. Heath & Sharkey, Recent Significant Texas Real Estate Decisions, 1985 STATE
BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED REAL EST. L. COURSE A, A-25.
236. 685 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ granted).




241. 677 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
242. Id. at 249 (citing Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Baldwin, 416 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
243. 677 S.W.2d at 249 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; Franklin v. Woods, 598
S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)). The Texas Constitution
provides that:
[tihe homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby
protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase
money thereof, or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for
work and material used in constructing improvements thereon, and in this last
case only when the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the
consent of both spouses, in the case of a family homestead, given in the same
manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance of the homestead ....
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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founded upon a written contract. 244 The trial court could properly have
found the property to be the homestead of one of the two homeowners stated
the court. 24 5
In 1973 the Texas Legislature amended the constitution to afford single
individuals protection from foreclosure on homestead property.246 The
court inferred that the Legislature intended the same protections to be avail-
able for single households as had previously existed for marital home-
steads. 24 7 The purpose of a written contract requirement is to protect
homestead property regardless of marital status, stated the court.248 The
Stewart court found requiring a written contract for a marital homestead,
but not for a single person's homestead, to be discriminatory and in deroga-
tion of the constitution. 249 The court therefore concluded that a written
contract was required to establish a lien for improvements on either a single
or a family homestead. 2 50
In Jeter v. Seminole State National Bank 25' a United States Bankruptcy
Court held that to maintain the vigor of the homestead provisions of the
Texas Constitution, both spouses must sign mechanic's lien contracts for im-
provements on their homestead, and both spouses must confirm and consent
to extensions and renewals of mechanic's and materialmen's liens for those
improvements. 252 The court also found a mechanic's lien contract that was
not executed until after completion of the construction to be ineffective
against a Texas homestead. 253 Texas law requires that both spouses sign a
written contract for homestead improvements before materials are delivered
and labor commenced. 254 The Jeter case also contains a good discussion of
the distinction between the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as re-
ceiver and as a corporate insurer.255
244. 677 S.W.2d at 250.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 249.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 249-50.
249. Id. at 250.
250. Id.
251. 48 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
252. Id. at 408.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 407 (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (Vernon 1958)). Article
5460 has been repealed, effective January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 53.059 (Vernon 1984).
255. 677 S.W.2d at 409-12. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 873-76 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982) (comprehensive discussion of the
distinction between the FDIC as receiver and the FDIC as corporate insurer). Familiarity
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1982 & Supp. 1984), and with
the D'Oench doctrine, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), is important in
dealing with failing and insolvent lending institutions. The Jeter court explains:
[t]he basic premise of D'Oench and its progency is that the maker of a note is
estopped from raising defenses against FDIC, because the maker has acted in
contravention of a general policy to protect the FDIC, and the public funds
which it administers, against misrepresentations of the assets of a bank which is
to be insured.
48 Bankr. at 409-10.
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B. Labor
Priority contests involving mechanic's and materialmen's liens occur not
only between mortgagees and statutory lienholders but also among statutory
lienholders. Because of the continued uncertainty arising from conflicting
case law, mortgagees, original contractors, subcontractors, developers, and
property owners do not know how best to protect their interests. In
Branecky v. Seaman2 56 an architect asserted statutory and constitutional
liens, but the Corpus Christi court of appeals denied enforcement of both
liens.2 57 The architect contracted with a developer to provide architectural
services for a proposed motel, prepared the plans and specifications, and ap-
plied for a building permit. The architect later learned that someone had
traced or copied his plans and put an engineer's seal on them. The architect
concluded that the developer intended to breach the contract and filed an
affidavit for a mechanic's and materialman's lien. The landowner was
neither a party to the architect's contract nor a partner of the developer.
The land that the architect filed the lien against belonged solely to the land-
owner and remained unimproved. The district court ruled that the architect
was not entitled to a lien. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
labor expended by the architect in preparing plans and specifications for im-
provements to land that were never begun was not labor expended in the
making or repairing of a building;2 58 therefore the architect was not entitled
to a constitutional or statutory lien.2 59
Courts have considered the language of article 5452 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes2 60 evidence of a legislative intent to provide a lien for any
person who labors to build a structure or improvements.26' Architects who
prepare plans and supervise construction perform labor apparently within
the meaning of the article 5452 and they may therefore obtain a statutory
lien. 262 To obtain a lien, an architect may have to supervise construction in
addition to preparing plans. 263 The Banecky architect merely prepared
plans that were never used. The court of appeals construed the statutory
language to require more than the mere preparation of plans for a project
that is never started.2 64 The court stated that owners often need to have
plans prepared to decide whether or not to build an improvement. 265 The
court further stated that until construction begins, no property exists to
256. 688 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
257. Id. at 120.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1986). Article 5452 has
been repealed, effective January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.021-
.023 (Vernon 1984).
261. 688 S..W.2d at 119 (citing Stanguinett & Statts v. Colorado Salt Co., 150 S.W. 490,
491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1912, writ refd)).
262. 688 S.W.2d at 119 (citing 150 S.W. at 491).
263. 688 S.W.2d at 120 (citing Lancaster v. McKenzie, 439 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1965, no writ)).




which a statutory lien can attach. 2 66 Finally, the court found no case author-
ity for the architect's contention that he was entitled to a constitutional
lien.267
C Payment Bonds
In some contrast to Branecky, the Texas Supreme Court stated in Indus-
trial Indemnity Co. v. Zack Burckett Co. 268 that the Texas mechanic's and
materialman's lien statutes are to be liberally construed to protect laborers
and materialmen. 269 In its per curiam opinion refusing an application for
writ of error,270 the court also considered the necessity of statutory warnings
in a subcontractor's notice to perfect his claim against a payment bond.
The subcontractor contracted with the general contractor who later ob-
tained a payment bond. After the general contractor failed to pay him, the
subcontractor wrote to the general contractor demanding payment and giv-
ing notice of his intent to file a lien on the property if the general contractor
did not pay him within ten days. A copy of the letter was sent to the prop-
erty owner. The subcontractor filed suit; the general contractor declared
bankruptcy. The subcontractor received a partial payment through the
bankruptcy court. The district court awarded the subcontractor the ten per-
cent contractual retainage. The court of appeals reformed the district
court's judgment and rendered judgment for the subcontractor's full claim
against the payment bond. The court of appeals found compliance with the
retainage statute sufficient to perfect a claim against the surety on the pay-
ment bond. 27 1 The Texas Supreme Court stated that Texas Revised Civil
Statute article 5469, the retainage statute, required the owner to retain ten
percent of the contract price for unpaid mechanics and materialmen.2 72 If a
payment bond covered the project, however, subcontractors were relegated
to claims on the bond, relieving the owner of any obligation to retain funds
or to pay undisputed claims. 273 The court held that compliance with the
retainage statute did not constitute compliance with the article 5472d, the
payment bond statute, 274 for perfecting a claim against a payment bond. 275
The court expressly disapproved Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37).
268. 677 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1984).
269. Id. at 495.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 494-95. The court of appeals decision, Zack Burkett Co. v. Industrial Indemn.
Co., 662 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), was discussed in
Dooley, Real Property: Landlord and Tenant, Mortgages, and Mechanics' and Materialmen's
Liens, 39 Sw. L.J. 272 (1985).
272. 677 S.W.2d at 495. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon 1958 & Supp.
1986) has been repealed, effective January 1, 1984, and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 53.101-.105 (Vernon 1984).
273. 677 S.W.2d at 495 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d (Vernon Supp.
1986) (repealed)).
274. Article 5472d has been replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.201-.211 (Vernon
1984). See also Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 655,
699 (1972).
275. 667 S.W.2d at 495.
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Palmer.276 In Trinity, the San Antonio court of appeals held that statutory
warnings were required to perfect a claim against a payment bond. 2 7 7 The
Texas Supreme Court concluded, that "[t]o require that an owner be warned
that 'he may be personally liable and his property subjected to lien' when,
because of the presence of the payment bond, the owner is relieved of liabil-
ity, would be to require subcontractors to perform a meaningless
exercise." 278
An original contractor may furnish a payment bond for the benefit of
claimants. 279 If a valid bond is filed, a lienholder must look to the surety for
payment and not to the property owner.2 80 If the lienholder has perfected
his lien against the surety and the claim remains unpaid for sixty days after
perfection thereof, then the lienholder may sue the principal and surety on
the bond, jointly or severally. 28 1
In Sentry Insurance Co. v. Radcliff Materials of Texas, Inc.282 a supplier
of materials to a subcontractor brought suit against the surety on the origi-
nal contractor's bond. The subcontractor and original contractor had en-
tered into a contract agreement for construction on a parking lot. The
surety issued a performance and payment bond naming the subcontractor as
principal and the original contractor as obligee. Radcliff Materials supplied
the building materials to the subcontractor. After the subcontractor failed
to pay for the materials on time, Radcliff sent notices, filed a mechanic's and
materialman's lien on the property, and initiated a lawsuit. The trial court
awarded Radcliff a judgment against the surety. The trial court treated the
bond as a Hardeman Act Bond.283 The Houston court of appeals reversed,
holding that the bond did not comply with the requirement of section 53.202
of the Property Code and therefore was not a Hardeman Act Bond. 284 The
Hardeman Act provides a statutory scheme for the substitution of an origi-
nal contractor's payment bond for whatever relief derivative claimants (sub-
contractors and those furnishing materials and labor) might obtain against
the owner and his property.285 A properly executed and recorded Harde-
man Act Bond relieves the owner of liability to derivative claimants.286 To
comply with the statutory requirements of the Hardeman Act the bond must
be conditioned on prompt payment for all labor, subcontracts, materials,
specially fabricated materials, and normal and usual extras not exceeding
276. 412 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
277. 667 S.W.2d at 495; 412 S.W.2d at 695-96.
278. 667 S.W.2d at 495.
279. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.201 (Vernon 1984).
280. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.206 (Vernon 1984).
281. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.208 (Vernon 1984).
282. 687 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1985, no writ).
283. Id. at 440. The provisions of the Hardeman Act (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts.
5452-5457e) have incorporated into TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.201-.211 (Vernon 1984).
284. 687 S.W.2d at 440.
285. Id. (citing Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Felker, 469 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex. 1971)). See
also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.201 (Vernon 1984).
286. 469 S.W.2d at 390.
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fifteen percent of the contract price.287 The bond must also be in favor of the
owner, have the written approval of the owner endorsed on it, and be exe-
cuted by the original contractor as principal. 288 The bond in Sentry was in
favor of the original contractor and was executed by the subcontractor. In
addition, the Sentry bond stated that the subcontractor would reimburse the
original contractor for all loss and damages sustained only if the subcontrac-
tor failed to perform its obligations. There was no language in the Sentry
bond indicating that it was intended for the protection of subcontractors or
materialmen who were not paid for services or material provided to the gen-
eral contractor. The court concluded that even if it modified the terms of
the bond to include parties not named or to realign priorities among the
obligees of the bond, the bond would still contain a substantial defect in that
it was not conditioned on prompt payment for labor, contracts, or materials
as required by section 53.202 of the Property Code.28 9
D. Construction Contract Trusts
In RepublicBank Dallas, NA. v. Interkal, Inc. 290 a bank sued the benefici-
ary-materialman of a construction contract trust, claiming a superior right
to money received by the contractor for construction and remodeling of
gymnasiums. The contractor had contracts to build gymnasiums for
schools. Interkal furnished materials to the contractor. The contractor had
borrowed money from RepublicBank, using its accounts receivable as secur-
ity. The contractor defaulted on its loan to RepublicBank, and the bank
sued to collect. Since the events giving rise to the cause of action took place
before the enactment of the Property Code, the language of Texas Revised
Civil Statutes article 5472e was controlling. 291 Interpreting article 5472e, the
Texas Supreme Court considered whether the materialman, Interkal, or the
creditor, RepublicBank, had the superior right to the funds held by the con-
tractor. The court stated that
the material part of article 5472e provides that the act shall have no
application to any bank, savings and loan association or other lender or
to any title company or other closing agent in connection with any
transaction to which this act is applicable. . . . The legislature clearly
287. Section 53.202 of the Property Code provides that a bond to pay liens or claims must
meet the following requirements:
(1) be in a penal sum at least equal to the total of the original contract amount;
(2) be in favor of the owner;
(3) have the written approval of the owner endorsed on it;
(4) be executed by:
(a) the original contractor as principal; and
(b) a corporate surety authorized to do business in this state; and
(5) be conditioned on prompt payment for all labor, subcontractors, materials,
specially fabricated materials, and normal and usual extras not exceeding
fifteen percent of the contract price.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.202 (Vernon 1984).
288. 687 S.W.2d at 440.
289. Id. at 441.
290. 691 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1985), rev'g 677 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984).
291. TEX. REV. CI'. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (repealed); see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 162.001-.033 (Vernon 1984).
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stated that the act protecting materialmen's liens is not applicable to
any transaction involving a bank.292
The court concluded that "under the plain language of the statute, the
bank's priority as a secured creditor over the materialman is not
defeated. 293
It appears that the recodification of article 5472e at current section
162.004 of the Property Code has in fact effected a substantive change.294
The Property Code eliminates the words that formed the basis of the In-
terkal opinion, "in connection with any transaction to which this act is ap-
plicable."' 295 Whether or not the Texas Supreme Court will reach the same
conclusion when confronted with facts similar to the Interkal case under
section 162.004 of the Property Code is uncertain because of the legislature's
editorial omission of the exact words the court relied on in reaching its
decision.
292. 691 S.W.2d at 607 (court's emphasis).
293. Id. at 608. The Texas Supreme Court's decision essentially followed the dissent of
Justice Sparling of the Dallas court of appeals. 677 S.W.2d 759 at 762-4 (Sparling, J.,
dissenting).
294. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.004 (Vernon 1984).
295. Id.
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